Buchanan v. Cassell
335 P.2d 600 · Washington Supreme Court · 1959
Facts
Clayton and Hanna Buchanan own land between State Highway No. 3 and the west bank of the Snake River. The disputed property is an unplatted strip extending from the east boundary of the Buchanans' tract to the high-water mark of the Snake River. The Buchanans' predecessors, W. A. and Gertrude Woodring, purchased nearby platted property in 1919 and occupied the disputed strip for 32 years, building a home, barn, fences to the river, and using it for farming and pasturing. W. A. Woodring conveyed the land to his wife Gertrude in 1951 via a quitclaim deed with a metes and bounds description that omitted the disputed strip. Gertrude Woodring then sold the property to the Buchanans in 1952, using the same description, believing it included the disputed strip. Charles and Laurel Cassell claim title to the disputed property through a quitclaim deed from the successor to the original improvement company. The disputed area is not assessed for taxes, and no one has paid taxes on it.
Procedural history
The plaintiffs initiated an action to quiet title to real property. At the close of the plaintiffs' case, the defendants moved for dismissal, which the trial court granted, quieting title in the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed this decision. This court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
Issue
The central legal question is whether a deed's metes and bounds description, which omits a disputed strip of land, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of adverse possession by the grantor. Specifically, can the Woodrings' deed, despite omitting the strip they occupied, prevent the Buchanans from tacking their possession to the Woodrings' to meet the ten-year adverse possession statute?
Holding
The court held that the deed, by itself, was not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the Woodrings' intent to claim the disputed property as their own, given their 32 years of continuous use. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' action. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial.
Rule
A purchaser may tack the adverse use of a predecessor in interest to their own where the land was intended to be included in the deed but was mistakenly omitted from the description. Successive periods of occupation can be united to meet the adverse holding time if there is privity between occupants holding adversely. Actual occupation, use, and improvement of premises as if one were the owner creates a presumption of entry and holding as an absolute owner. This presumption establishes a claim of right unless rebutted by explanatory circumstances showing a contrary intention. The court found that the trial court's conclusion that the deed rebutted this presumption was speculative and lacked substantial evidence.
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