Guillermo Solis-Ramirez v. United States Department Of Justice

758 F.2d 1426 · Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · 1985

Facts

Guillermo Solis-Ramirez, a Mexican native, was classified as a "special immigrant" in 1976 with a priority date, exempt from labor certification due to his U.S. citizen daughter. However, a visa backlog prevented his lawful admission. In October 1976, immigration laws changed, classifying him as a non-preference immigrant under a "savings clause," but no visas have been available for this category since 1978. By 1982, living illegally in Florida, Solis-Ramirez sought to become a sixth preference immigrant, but the INS rejected his employer's visa petition because he lacked the required labor certification.

Procedural history

After the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) rejected his visa application, Solis-Ramirez sought administrative review and then filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The district court granted the INS's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Solis-Ramirez then appealed this decision to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Issue

Does the "savings clause" of the 1976 Immigration and Nationality Act allow an immigrant who established a priority date under the old law to obtain sixth preference status without a labor certification? Did the district court err procedurally in dismissing the case?

Holding

The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that the savings clause does not exempt Solis-Ramirez from the labor certification requirement for a preference classification. The district court also correctly applied the procedural rules for a motion to dismiss.

Rule

Courts must first look to the plain meaning of a statute, and legislative history is only considered if the statute is inescapably ambiguous. The savings clause unambiguously classifies immigrants with old priority dates as non-preference and does not eliminate the labor certification requirement for preference classifications. Furthermore, a court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must accept factual allegations as true but not conclusions of law, and attachments to the complaint are part of the pleadings, preventing conversion to summary judgment.

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