Lawhorn v. State
898 S.W.2d 886 · Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · 1995
Facts
Appellant was arrested for aggravated sexual assault. About a month later, while being transported in handcuffs by Deputy Waddle from the City of Austin jail to the Travis County jail, appellant fled on foot from the van. Deputy Waddle chased him briefly but lost sight of him and gave up the pursuit. An off-duty deputy, Lieutenant Caldwell, saw appellant in jail uniform and handcuffs near the jail and followed him to the Regency Apartments, where Caldwell lived and worked. Caldwell heard breaking glass, and shortly thereafter, appellant was found lying on the kitchen floor of apartment 114, which he had entered by breaking a window. The apartment's occupant, Mary Savala, did not give appellant consent to enter. The entire incident, from escape to apprehension, lasted about twenty to twenty-five minutes.
Procedural history
Appellant was convicted by a jury of burglary and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. The Third Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and reformed the judgment to reflect an acquittal, finding the evidence insufficient. This Court granted the State’s petitions for discretionary review to determine if the Court of Appeals erred in its sufficiency analysis.
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that the offense of escape was completed as a matter of law before the appellant entered the apartment? Did the Court of Appeals err in applying the principle of legal impossibility to determine that appellant could not have intended to commit felony escape when he entered the apartment?
Holding
The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment, holding that the offense of escape was complete as a matter of law prior to appellant's entry into the apartment. Therefore, it was legally impossible for appellant to have intended to commit felony escape when he entered the apartment, and the evidence was insufficient to support the burglary conviction.
Rule
The offense of escape, defined as an "unauthorized departure from custody," is complete once the act of leaving a state of detention or restraint is accomplished; it is not a continuing offense that includes subsequent flight or evasion. The Legislature did not include flight or continued evasion as elements of escape. Legal impossibility, a valid defense, exists when the act the actor intends to accomplish would not constitute a crime, or the specific crime charged, even if fully executed. In this context, because the escape was already complete, intending to continue evading capture was not an intent to commit the felony escape itself, making it legally impossible to form the intent for burglary with felony escape as the predicate.
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