Ocasio v. United States
578 U.S. 282 · Supreme Court of the United States · 2016
Facts
Samuel Ocasio, a Baltimore Police Department officer, participated in a kickback scheme with the owners of Majestic Auto Repair Shop, Hernan Alexis Moreno Mejia and Edwin Javier Mejia. When Ocasio and other officers responded to auto accidents, they persuaded damaged car owners to have their vehicles towed to Majestic. In exchange for these referrals, the officers received payments of $150 to $300 from the shopowners. Ocasio would often call Moreno from accident scenes to ensure profitability before directing vehicles to Majestic and then request payment. This scheme, which began in 2008 and Ocasio joined in 2009, substantially increased Majestic's business, providing at least 90% of its customers by early 2011. Moreno, Mejia, Ocasio, and other officers were indicted in 2011.
Procedural history
Petitioner Ocasio was convicted by a jury in District Court of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act and three substantive Hobbs Act violations. Before trial, he sought a jury instruction requiring the conspiracy to obtain money from someone not a member of the conspiracy, which the District Court denied. The District Court also denied his motions for acquittal on the conspiracy count. Ocasio appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which rejected his argument and affirmed his convictions. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
Issue
Can a defendant be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act by obtaining money from a co-conspirator under color of official right, or must the property be obtained from someone outside the conspiracy?
Holding
Yes, a defendant may be convicted of conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act based on proof that he entered into a conspiracy that had as its objective the obtaining of property from another conspirator with his consent and under color of official right. The Court affirmed Ocasio's conspiracy conviction.
Rule
Under longstanding principles of conspiracy law, a defendant may be convicted of conspiring to commit a substantive offense even if they are incapable of personally committing that offense. The fundamental characteristic of a conspiracy is a joint commitment to an endeavor that, if completed, would satisfy all elements of the underlying crime. A conspirator need not agree to commit every part of the substantive offense, but must have the specific intent that the underlying crime be committed by some member of the conspiracy. When a person's consent or acquiescence is inherent in the underlying substantive offense, something more than bare consent or acquiescence may be needed to prove that the person was a conspirator.
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