Printz v. United States
138 L. Ed. 2d 914 · Supreme Court of the United States · 1997
Facts
The Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) established a federal scheme for firearm distribution, prohibiting transfers to certain individuals. In 1993, Congress enacted the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which included interim provisions requiring firearms dealers to obtain a Brady Form from prospective handgun purchasers, verify their identity, and provide notice and a copy of the form to the chief law enforcement officer (CLEO) of the transferee’s residence. Dealers were required to wait five business days before completing the sale, unless the CLEO notified them otherwise. The Act mandated CLEOs to make a reasonable effort to ascertain within five business days whether the transfer would be illegal, including research in state, local, and national record systems. Petitioners Jay Printz and Richard Mack, CLEOs for Ravalli County, Montana, and Graham County, Arizona, respectively, filed separate actions challenging the constitutionality of these interim provisions.
Procedural history
Petitioners Printz and Mack filed separate actions in District Courts, which held the background check provision unconstitutional but severable. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding none of the Brady Act’s interim provisions unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Issue
Does the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act's interim provisions, which command state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers and perform related tasks, violate the Constitution?
Holding
Yes, the interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which compel state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks and perform related tasks, are unconstitutional.
Rule
The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. This principle is derived from the Constitution's structure of dual sovereignty, which preserves the States as independent and autonomous political entities. Commandeering state executive officers into federal service would immeasurably augment federal power and undermine the President's executive unity and accountability. The Necessary and Proper Clause does not authorize laws that violate state sovereignty, and the Supremacy Clause only applies to laws made "in Pursuance [of the Constitution]." This prohibition extends to compelling state officers directly, regardless of whether policymaking is involved or the burden is minimal.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener
Case brief last reviewed . Prepared by CaseReader from the published opinion.