Richard Lambertson v. United States
528 F.2d 441 · Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 1976
Facts
On August 30, 1972, Richard Lambertson, an employee of Armour & Co., was unloading a truck shipment of beef at Armour’s Syracuse plant. While engaged in this task, William Boslet, a meat inspector for the United States Department of Agriculture, suddenly jumped on Lambertson from behind, screaming “boo.” Boslet pulled Lambertson’s wool stocking hat over his eyes and began to ride him piggyback. As a result of this action, Lambertson fell forward and struck his face on nearby meat hooks, suffering severe injuries to his mouth and teeth. All witnesses agreed that the incident was one-sided horseplay, and Boslet had no intention to injure Lambertson, apologizing immediately afterward.
Procedural history
Plaintiff commenced an action against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, presided over by Judge Edmund Port, dismissed the action. The dismissal was based on the conclusion that the government employee's actions constituted a battery, which is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). This appeal was taken from that order of dismissal.
Issue
Did the District Court err in concluding that the government employee's actions, which involved intentional physical contact but no intent to injure, constituted a battery, thereby barring the plaintiff's claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act's intentional tort exception?
Holding
No, the District Court did not err. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Boslet’s actions constituted a battery, and thus the claim arose out of a battery and was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
Rule
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity for certain torts but expressly excepts claims arising out of assault or battery under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). To determine if this exception applies, courts must examine the substance of the claim, not merely the plaintiff's chosen theory (e.g., negligence). Under New York common law, the essential element of battery is the intent to make contact, not the intent to cause injury. Therefore, an intentional physical contact, even if intended as a joke and without a specific intent to cause harm, constitutes a battery.
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