State v. Beale
299 A.2d 921 · 1973
Facts
The Defendant operates an antique shop in Hallowell. One Saturday in the summer of 1971, while the Defendant was absent and his wife, Mrs. Beale, was minding the store, a prospective customer, Mrs. Johnson, identified several items of silverware and glass as property stolen from her months earlier. Mrs. Johnson returned with a Hallowell police officer, who told Mrs. Beale that the items were "possibly stolen" and should be set aside and not sold. Mrs. Beale complied and was instructed to tell her husband to contact the officer. The following Monday, a deputy sheriff visited the store, and the Defendant informed him that he had put the articles back on sale Sunday morning and had sold many of them, including those with distinctive initials, despite the officer's request. The Defendant testified he had purchased the items from reliable people, had receipts, and was entitled to sell them.
Procedural history
The Defendant was convicted under 17 M.R.S.A. § 3551 of knowingly concealing stolen property. The Defendant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial court's instruction regarding the definition of "knowing." The case arrived before this court to construe the phrase "knowing it to be stolen" for the first time.
Issue
Did the Legislature intend for the jury to determine the defendant's knowledge of stolen property using a subjective test (actual belief) or an objective test (what a reasonable person would have known)?
Holding
The court held that the statute requires proof that the Defendant himself believed the goods were stolen, thus requiring a subjective test for knowledge, and set aside the conviction for a new trial.
Rule
The legal rule for "knowing it to be stolen" in 17 M.R.S.A. § 3551 requires a subjective test, meaning the State must prove the defendant himself actually believed the goods were stolen, not merely that a reasonable person would have believed them to be stolen. The court reasoned that the essence of this criminal offense is intentional wrongdoing, distinguishing it from civil responsibility where an objective standard might apply. While direct knowledge is not required, the defendant must have been aware of circumstances that caused him to believe the items were stolen, and juries may infer this belief from the defendant's speech, conduct, and the information available to him, considering what a person of ordinary intellectual capacity would have formed from such facts.
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