United States v. Jo Ann Harrelson, Charles Voyed Harrelson and Elizabeth Nichols Chagra
754 F.2d 1153 · U.S. Court of Appeals · 1985
Facts
In May 1979, United States District Judge John Wood was murdered by a dumdum bullet fired into his back at his townhouse residence in San Antonio. Appellant Charles Harrelson was placed at the scene, and further investigation indicated the murder was arranged by Jamiel Chagra, a gambler and narcotics dealer who was to be tried before Judge Wood and feared his reputation for severe sentences. Joseph Chagra, Jamiel's brother, was implicated in the plot and later turned state's evidence. Jamiel's wife, Elizabeth Chagra, and Charles Harrelson's wife, Jo Ann Harrelson, were also implicated, with Jo Ann procuring the murder weapon and assisting in its disposition. Jo Ann's daughter, Teresa Starr, traveled to Las Vegas to receive 'blood money' from Elizabeth Chagra for the murder.
Procedural history
Elizabeth Chagra and the Harrelsons were tried together and convicted on all charges. This appeal was brought by them from those convictions. The appellate court affirmed some convictions and reversed and remanded one for a new trial.
Issue
The primary legal questions were whether the trial court erred in denying a change of venue due to pretrial publicity, refusing to recuse the trial judge, admitting testimony despite claims of attorney-client and marital privileges, allowing electronically intercepted conversations, and providing an erroneous jury instruction regarding the intent required for conspiracy to commit murder.
Holding
The court affirmed the convictions of Charles Harrelson and Jo Ann Harrelson on all charges. It affirmed Elizabeth Chagra's conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice but reversed her conviction for conspiracy to commit murder, remanding that charge for a new trial.
Rule
A change of venue is required only if prejudice is so great that a fair trial is impossible, a decision within the trial court's discretion, and a presumption of prejudice from publicity can be rebutted by an impartial jury selection process. Recusal of a judge under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires personal bias stemming from an extrajudicial source, causing a reasonable person to doubt impartiality. The attorney-client privilege does not apply to communications made in furtherance of intended or continuing illegality, and the marital privilege does not protect conversations between spouses about crimes in which they are jointly participating. Electronic interception of 'oral communications' requires an expectation of privacy, which prisoners generally lack in jail. Conspiracy to commit a substantive offense requires the same degree of criminal intent as the substantive offense itself, and a jury instruction that deviates from this requirement or constructively amends the indictment is reversible error.
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