Whitfield v. United States

160 L. Ed. 2d 611 · Supreme Court of the United States · 2005

Facts

Petitioners were members of the executive board of Greater Ministries International Church (GMIC), which operated a "gifting" program from 1996 to 1999, taking in over $400 million. Petitioners and others induced investors to give money to GMIC with false promises of double returns within 18 months. They marketed the program nationwide, claiming GMIC would generate returns through overseas investments in gold, diamonds, commodities, and offshore banks, and use profits for philanthropy. Most of these claims were false; GMIC made no promised investments, had no assets, and gave little to charity. Many participants received little or no return, and petitioners allegedly received over $1.2 million in commissions.

Procedural history

In March 1999, a federal grand jury indicted petitioners, charging them with conspiracy to launder money under § 1956(h). At trial, the District Court denied petitioners' request for a jury instruction requiring proof of an overt act, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that § 1956(h) does not require proof of an overt act. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits and affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision.

Issue

Does a conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy?

Holding

No, conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) does not require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Rule

The Court applies the principle of statutory construction that, absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms. The common law understanding of conspiracy does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liability. A "formulary" exists: if Congress chooses a text modeled on 18 U.S.C. § 371, it gets an overt-act requirement; if modeled on the Sherman Act or 21 U.S.C. § 846 (which omit an express overt-act requirement), it dispenses with such a requirement. Because 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) does not expressly make an overt act an element, the Government need not prove one.

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Case brief last reviewed 2026-10-01. Prepared by CaseReader from the published opinion.