Zielinski v. Philadelphia Piers, Inc.

139 F. Supp. 408 · 1956

Facts

Plaintiff Frank Zielinski was injured on February 9, 1953, while working on Pier 96, Philadelphia, for J. A. McCarthy, when two motor-driven fork lifts collided. One fork lift, bearing initials "P. P. I.", was operated by Sandy Johnson. Plaintiff filed a complaint believing this fork lift was owned and operated by defendant Philadelphia Piers, Inc., and Johnson was its agent. Unbeknownst to plaintiff, defendant had sold its freight moving business to Carload Contractors, Inc. over a year prior, and Johnson had been transferred to Carload Contractors' payroll. Defendant's initial answers to interrogatories and Johnson's deposition testimony reinforced the belief that Johnson was defendant's employee. Plaintiff only discovered the true ownership and employment situation at a pre-trial conference and through supplementary interrogatories in late 1955. By this time, the statute of limitations for suing Carload Contractors, Inc. had expired on February 9, 1955. Defendant now admits it owned the fork lift and leased it to Carload Contractors, Inc., and also leased the pier where the accident occurred.

Issue

Whether, for the purposes of this case, the motor-driven fork lift operated by Sandy Johnson on February 9, 1953, was owned by defendant Philadelphia Piers, Inc., and whether Sandy Johnson was its agent acting in the course of his employment on that date.

Holding

The court ordered that for the purposes of the trial, it shall be stated to the jury that the towmotor or fork lift bearing the initials 'P. P. I.' was owned by the defendant and that Sandy Johnson was a servant in the employ of the defendant and doing its work on February 9, 1953.

Rule

Under F.R.Civ.P. 8(b), a defendant's general denial of a multi-part averment is ineffective if some parts are true, especially when it misleads the plaintiff about the proper defendant. Principles of equity require a defendant to be estopped from denying agency if its inaccurate statements and statements in the record, which it knew or had means of knowing were inaccurate, deprived the plaintiff of a right of action. This doctrine applies when a party is misled by conduct, even without fraud, and relies on it to their prejudice, particularly when the statute of limitations has run, barring suit against the proper party.

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