Creasy v. Rusk
730 N.E.2d 659 · Indiana Supreme Court · 2000
Facts
Lloyd Rusk, an Alzheimer's patient with a history of agitation and violence, resided at the Brethren Healthcare Center (BHC) since 1992 due to memory loss and confusion. Carol Creasy, a certified nursing assistant, was employed at BHC and responsible for Rusk's care, knowing his condition and combative tendencies. On May 16, 1995, Creasy and another CNA were attempting to put an agitated Rusk to bed. During this process, Rusk violently kicked Creasy multiple times in her left knee and hip area. Creasy suffered injuries to her lower back and left knee as a result.
Procedural history
Creasy filed a civil negligence suit against Rusk. The trial court granted Rusk's motion for summary judgment. Creasy appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that mental capacity must be considered in determining duty and that a factual issue existed regarding Rusk's capacity. The Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals' opinion, and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for Rusk.
Issue
1) Whether the general duty of care imposed upon adults with mental disabilities is the same as that for adults without mental disabilities. 2) Whether the circumstances of Rusk's case are such that this general duty of care should be imposed upon him towards his professional caregiver.
Holding
The court held that adults with mental disabilities generally have the same duty of care as those without. However, it concluded that Rusk did not owe a duty of care to Creasy due to the specific relationship between them and public policy considerations. The trial court's grant of summary judgment for Rusk was affirmed.
Rule
Adults with mental disabilities are generally held to the same standard of care as a reasonable person under the same circumstances, without regard to their capacity to control or understand their actions. This rule is based on public policy considerations such as allocating losses to the party who caused them, incentivizing guardians to prevent harm, preventing feigned disabilities, and avoiding administrative difficulties in assessing mental capacity. However, an exception to this general rule exists where the relationship between the parties and public policy negate the imposition of a duty. This exception applies to institutionalized Alzheimer's patients who injure paid caregivers, as caregivers are employed to encounter such risks, are better positioned to prevent injury, and workers' compensation exists for such losses, thus negating the public policy rationales for imposing a duty.
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