Richeson v. State
704 N.E.2d 1008 · Indiana Supreme Court · 1998
Facts
Appellant Walter William Richeson attended a party with Andrew Przybyla and Adam Glenn, where they discussed a prior drive-by shooting of Glenn's home, for which they believed Michael Foster was responsible. The three men decided to retaliate by driving by and "shooting up [Foster's] house" with semi-automatic assault rifles. Glenn drove slowly past Foster's residence twice. On the second pass, Przybyla shot from the passenger side, and Richeson shot from the hatchback from the back seat. Armor-piercing bullets passed through the walls, windows, and front door, penetrating the living space of Michael Foster's home. Michael Foster told his parents to "get down" and attempted to dial 911 during the shooting. Neither Foster nor his parents were hit.
Procedural history
Richeson was convicted of attempted battery and criminal recklessness by a trial court, despite his objection to the jury instruction on mens rea for attempted battery. The trial court's instruction allowed conviction for "knowingly or intentionally" attempting battery. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, applying attempted murder precedent. This court granted review due to a split of authority in the Court of Appeals regarding the application of the attempt statute.
Issue
Does the specific intent rule for attempted murder, established in Spradlin v. State, apply to other crimes, specifically attempted battery? More precisely, does the attempt statute require the State to prove that a defendant took a substantial step toward the completion of an intentional battery in an attempted battery prosecution?
Holding
The court held that the Spradlin rule, requiring specific intent, does not apply to attempted battery and is expressly limited to attempted murder. The attempt statute permits a jury instruction allowing conviction upon proof that the defendant took a substantial step toward a knowing battery. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
Rule
Indiana's attempt statute, Ind.Code § 35-41-5-l(a), states that a person attempts a crime when, acting with the culpability required for that crime, they take a substantial step toward its commission. For battery, the required culpability is "knowingly or intentionally." Therefore, for attempted battery, the State must prove the defendant took a substantial step to accomplish a knowing or intentional battery. The specific intent requirement for attempted murder, established in Spradlin, is a special exception due to murder's unique classification, severe penalties, and the "intent ambiguity" often present in attempted murder cases like drive-by shootings. Attempted battery, despite potential ambiguity, has a significantly lower penalty range, which reduces the need for a heightened mens rea requirement to prevent jury confusion.
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